Satvik Dev, Sonipat, 18 June 2024
In pursuit of achieving an optimal balance, often referred to as the ‘Goldilocks’ principle, states endeavor to establish a competent bureaucracy characterized by appropriate checks and balances. This ensures that the bureaucracy is neither overly weak, rendering it incapable of effective policy formulation, nor unreasonably strong, thereby preventing it from undermining individual rights and contractual obligations through predatory actions. Conceptualized as a set of governing institutions that are integrated within society to advance the public good, the structural configuration of each state is shaped by its unique historical and contextual factors (Centeno et al., 2017). The Indian State in this regard owing to its colonial experience boasts of an asymmetrical federal structure, deviating from the conventional federal system observed in the United States (Stepan et al., 2011). While analysts have often lauded the state’s capacity, particularly within its elite bureaucracy for policy formulation, there has been consistent concern over the significant deficiencies observed among front-line functionaries in program implementation (Kapur, 2020). This dynamic, characterized by a strong central authority but relatively weak implementation mechanisms, has led to commendable macro-level performance but has resulted in poor on-ground results (Kapur, 2020).
Academic research on this matter commonly cites two primary factors for the challenges in local-level policy implementation and institutional decline: dysfunctional bureaucracy and political party centralization. These factors are widely acknowledged and form the basis of scholarly consensus on the issue. A significant factor leading to dysfunctional bureaucracy is bureaucratic overload, marked by a condition where local bureaucrats face a significant lack of resources compared to their overwhelming responsibilities (Dasgupta & Kapur, 2020). India faces a notable disadvantage in its public employment framework across various levels of government when compared to other major federal states such as the US and China (Kapur, 2020). Specifically, local government expenditure in India comprises only 3 percent of the total government expenditure, a stark contrast to the 27 percent in the United States and 51 percent in China (Kapur, 2020). This disparity in financial allocation contributes to bureaucratic resource constraints, compelling local officials to handle a multitude of tasks, thereby hindering their ability to specialize (Dasgupta and Kapur, 2019). Consequently, this lack of specialization adversely affects the performance of development programs.
The failure to provide public goods undermines the legitimacy and trust necessary to foster a virtuous cycle that strengthens the social contract. This deficiency particularly affects the middle class, who may perceive themselves as inadequately served by the state and consequently turn to private provision of services. This shift has mirrored in the fiscal domain, where the Indian state has repeatedly faced challenges in tax collection and revenue generation from eligible taxpayers.
As far as centralization within political parties is concerned, it is evident that due to the ‘holding together’ federal system, central leadership inherently holds a superior position of command.Furthermore, India’s utilization of a centralized election machine model, as described by Rohrschneider, hinges on a strategy focused on chasing votes rather than mobilizing them (Kailash, 2024). Chasing strategies prioritize maximizing votes by appealing broadly to unaligned voters or the general electorate, often focusing on party leaders (Kailash, 2024). In contrast, mobilization strategies concentrate on engaging the party’s core supporters consistently, maintaining communication through the organization even between elections (Kailash, 2024). Mobilization relies on historical narratives, ideological alignment, and policy platforms to resonate with voters, while chasing strategies leverage technology to enhance their electoral appeal (Kailash, 2024). This makes party organisations what McKenzie refers to as vote-getting machines to ensure the return to office of political leaders (Kailash, 2024).
Party organizations consistently operate under the direction of central leadership, shaping public opinion according to the party’s vision of national interest. In this structure, policy ideas, positions, and programs originate from the leadership rather than the mass organization or supporters, with the organization serving primarily as a conduit for leadership (Kailash, 2024). This centralized approach diminishes the expression of local perspectives and contributes to the institutions falling short of meeting public expectations. During Nehru’s leadership in India, the party prioritized addressing its organizational challenges and adhering to its internal rules and regulations. Concurrently, the party leadership remained dedicated to core values and principles that had shaped the party during its formative phase (Kailash, 2024). These values not only guided the party’s actions but also facilitated its appeal across a diverse range of societal segments. In a later phase, Mrs. Gandhi went on to intensify the centralized structure within the party. She directly intervened in state and district-level party affairs, particularly in appointing key personnel, consolidating her influence across various levels of the party hierarchy (Kailash, 2024). Additionally, the systematic trend of appointing affluent candidates, post-liberalization, who can self-finance their campaigns, has fuelled the rise of dynastic politics (Chandra, 2016). This approach coupled with partisan politics has also led to a detachment from local perspectives and discontent among potential candidates outside wealthy circles (Vaishnav, 2024).
Furthermore, it is essential to recognize that none of these factors function independently to cause institutional shortcomings.Bureaucratic overload often stems from politicians’ limited electoral incentives to enhance local bureaucratic resources (Dasgupta & Kapur, 2020). Since it is challenging for voters to attribute improvements in implementation solely to specific politicians or parties, given the complex interplay of factors influencing bureaucratic capacity and implementation outcomes, it just diminishes the interest of the local politician to ensure policy implementation (Dasgupta & Kapur, 2020). Moreover, the overlap of rural development blocks with multiple legislators’ constituencies introduces competing political agents from different parties. This competition can reduce the incentive for a local leader to invest significantly in enhancing local bureaucratic resources, as such investments may not yield clear political advantages in a multi-agent environment. (Dasgupta & Kapur, 2020).Additionally, it is imperative to consider the implicit reluctance of lower-level government officers, often influenced by concerns over transfers, as well as the challenges faced by marginalized ground-level representatives who may lack the social capital necessary to effectively carry out their responsibilities.This has been demonstrated at length by Agnihotri in the contrasting state capacity outcomes between northern and southern Odisha which in itself makes a case of an independent analysis (Agnihotri, 2022). Therefore, overall, the absence of formidable decentralized administrative authority, combined with the fragmentation of the Indian party system, contributes to bureaucratic overload. This, in turn, leads to the erosion of political order at the local level.
References
Centeno, M. A., Kohli, A., Yashar, D. J., &Mistree, D. (2017, February 27). States in the Developing World. Cambridge University Press.
Stepan, A., Linz, J. J., & Yadav, Y. (2011, March 31). Crafting State-Nations. JHU Press.
Kapur, D. (2020, February 1). Why Does the Indian State Both Fail and Succeed? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 34(1), 31–54.
DASGUPTA, A., & KAPUR, D. (2020, August 6). The Political Economy of Bureaucratic
Overload: Evidence from Rural Development Officials in India. American Political Science Review, 114(4), 1316–1334.
Chandra, K. (2016). Democratic dynasties. Democratic Dynasties, 12–55.
Agnihotri, A. (2022, November). Transfer preferences of bureaucrats and spatial disparities in local state presence. World Development, 159, 106023.
